

~~NOFORN/NO DISSEM ABROAD/LIMITED BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

25X1A2g

Notes on Paragraphs of [REDACTED] Soviet Plans and Policies related to the German Situation.

Para 1 - October Exercises: In addition to the TASS announcement that the Warsaw Pact forces will conduct exercises during October and November (which was made subsequent to the source's report that combined exercises would begin in the first week of October), there are a number of indications of impending exercises. The scope and nature of these exercises cannot yet be determined, but it should be possible to obtain considerable information on them as they begin. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It should be noted that preparations required for exercises would be equally consistent with an increased readiness posture "under the guise of exercises," as well as highly effective as a backdrop to further negotiations.

Para 2 - Purpose of Exercises: As noted above, maneuvers would increase combat readiness but would also be consistent with political pressure for negotiations. The subterfuge implied in real preparations under the guise of exercises will be difficult to penetrate. The source is consistently ambiguous on the "strike first" and at no time has specified whether the strike is to be intercontinental, a ground-air assault on Western Europe or a limited attack along the Berlin access roads or air corridors. Although the general context of this and other reports from this source tends to imply a European attack, reference is made to a move into Iran and to the Chinese Communists defending against attacks from Japan. There is a notable absence of references to strategic missiles in discussions of the strike, despite the fact that the source has numerous contacts among artillery officers.

Para 3 - Mobilization: There is no evidence that a general Soviet mobilization has occurred or is contemplated. We consider 400,000 men to be a reasonable figure for the number of men being retained in the Soviet armed forces in accordance with the announcement that "necessary numbers" of men due for release this year would be held in service until after the German peace treaty. Previous independent calculations have led us to believe that as many as 350,000 conscripts would probably be retained. The official statements have stipulated retention until the peace treaty is signed; [REDACTED]

Para 4 - High Military Officers: We have no information that unusual numbers of Satellite officers are or have been in Moscow recently, but we do not necessarily obtain such information and consider it possible that increased numbers have been there in connection with current Warsaw Pact planning. Several senior Soviet officers (Marshals Malinovskiy, Grechko, Sokolovskiy and Golikov) have been on

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File

~~NOFORN/NO DISSEM ABROAD/LIMITED BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

~~NOFORN/NO DISSEM ABROAD/LIMITED BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

visits recently in Eastern Europe, which may be what source meant by "in the field." Apart from Konev's appointment as CinC of GSFG, and of Army General Batov as commander of the Southern Group of Forces in Hungary, we know of no other recent changes in command in key areas. [REDACTED]

25X1X
25X1X
& NSA

[REDACTED] We can neither confirm nor refute that missiles with nuclear warheads have recently been moved to tactical and strategic missile bases, but this source has reported earlier that he knows of two storage sites for nuclear warheads for missiles in the Soviet forces in Germany.

Para 5 - Khrushchev's Intentions: Commented on in the General Assessment.

Para 6 - Party Dissensions: We cannot comment on differences within the Presidium but note that Mikoyan would be a logical person to protest against Khrushchev's policies; few others would have the seniority and status to oppose the leader. We believe that the military is well under Party control and that the military leadership will bow to Khrushchev's orders despite their more conservative misgivings on the power balance. Khrushchev has recently stated--on 7 August--that in a Soviet-US clash "neither side would be ready to admit defeat without having used all weapons, even the most destructive--."

Para 7 - Malinovskiy Views: We cannot assess the accuracy of Malinovskiy's remarks. We have evidence that Malinovskiy did attend a party conference in the Carpathian Military District between 17 and 21 September but note that Malinovskiy is already a Party delegate from Moscow and is unlikely to have been elected to represent Lvov.

Para 8 - Party Congress: We regard the description of the tone of the Party Congress as quite plausible, although it is not clear whether the views in the rest of the paragraph are those of the senior Party official or of the source. An aggressive militant tone at the Congress is considered quite probable, particularly if no progress toward negotiations has been accomplished by then; such a posture would also be consistent with planned hostilities.

Para 9 - Attendance at Congress: We consider the attendance of foreign party officials at a Soviet Party congress to be quite expectable, although it seems doubtful that Mao would attend in the light of what we believe the state of Sino-Soviet relations to be. If he does attend, it will have great implications as to the condition of the Sino-Soviet relationship and as to the seriousness with which the Communist world is regarding the Berlin crisis.

There is evidence available that foreigners will be discouraged from visiting Moscow in this period; the Embassy was informed on 27 September that only very

~~NOFORN/NO DISSEM ABROAD/LIMITED BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

~~NOFORN/NO DISSEM ABROAD/LIMITED BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

limited and undesirable accommodations will be available for Embassy visitors for the next six weeks, and KLM was ordered on 29 September to evacuate its quarters in a downtown Moscow hotel. In addition, a group of Western peace marchers has been ordered to be out of the Western USSR by 8 October.

With regard to a PVO combat alert, there have been reports, that a similar alert was laid on during the 7 November celebrations in 1960, and one may be considered necessary for such an important gathering as the Party Congress in view of current international tension.

25X1X4

Para 10 - Move Into Iran: Reports [REDACTED] sources during August indicated that certain improvements were being made in Soviet military positions along the Iranian border, including repairing of gun positions and trench construction. It has also been alleged that villages along a section of the border were evacuated several months ago. There has been some redispotioning of major Soviet units within both the Transcaucasus and Turkestan Military Districts, including the introduction of some airborne elements, within the past 18 months, but there is no available evidence of a current buildup of forces.

Although we consider it extremely unlikely that Soviet intelligence on Iran (which is certainly very good) could have erroneously identified three US missile bases in Iran, the Soviets have made such charges in the past and have offered to show Iranian officials where they were on a map.

There is one indication of possible Soviet aggressive intentions toward Iran

25X1D1a
& NSA

Paras 11 and 12 - Civil Defense; Officer Shifts:

25X1D1a
& NSA

Marshal Chuikov was identified as the CinC of the Ground Forces on 20 September in a Soviet press account of his visit to Tbilisi. Nonetheless, we cannot discount that his deputy, Army General Zhadov, may now be acting in this post and that Chuikov has been appointed to the Civil Defense command, as stated by source. It is also possible that Marshal Chuikov is holding such

~~NOFORN/NO DISSEM ABROAD/LIMITED BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

~~NOFORN, NO DISSEM ABROAD, LIMITED BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

a post in addition to his duties as CinC of the Ground Forces, particularly since it is considered possible that the normal responsibilities of the CinC of the Ground Forces may include some duties in this field.

Marshal Sokolovskiy's recent attendance at Bulgaria's Liberation Day ceremonies may lend some support to the possibility that he is now occupying some important military post. We have no indication, other than two recent public appearances in Moscow, once reportedly in uniform, that Marshal Zhukov now occupies any official post.

Para 13 - Reinforcement of GSFG: Marshal Konev's command as CinC of GSFG includes seven armies, six ground and one air. If his command extends to Poland (which is not illogical, although there are no other reports [REDACTED] of this), he would command the equivalent of nine armies. The reinforcement of GSFG by six or more SAM units this year is supported by the identification of several new Soviet SAM sites and the withdrawal of the 100mm AA battalions from the seven Soviet AAA brigades in East Germany. The report suggests, however, that a further reinforcement of GSFG with SAM units is planned.

25X1D1a

& NSA

With regard to the possible planned reinforcement of Konev's command by the Eighth Mechanized Army, this army is identified in the Carpathian Military District, as stated by source, but we believe the designation "mechanized army" to be obsolete in Soviet terminology and are curious as to its appearance in this report. There is no indication as yet of an impending move by this army; [REDACTED]

25X1D1a

& NSA

[REDACTED] and recent observations of the garrisons of one of its subordinate divisions showed apparently normal occupancy. There have been a number of rumors from Poland, particularly in early September, of impending Soviet troop movements along the rail line from Lvov into southeastern Poland, but there has been no evidence that any significant movement of Soviet forces into or across Poland has yet occurred. We also have no evidence as yet of the assembly of rolling stock in Eastern Europe on a scale which would be required to support movements of army size. However, some future movements, although not necessarily of the Eighth Mechanized Army, cannot be entirely discounted.

Para 14 - Nuclear Tests: We believe that the view may well be true that the present nuclear tests are to check out delivery systems but note that only four of the twenty shots can be associated with missiles, that air drops from BADGER/TU-16s continue (though this was tested in 1958), and that there is no evidence available of tests of such more advanced weapons as air-to-surface nuclear missiles.

~~NOFORN, NO DISSEM ABROAD, LIMITED BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~